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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the following division problem: one unit of a good (for example,
money) is to be divided among n individuals who are entitled to a minimal share of this
good, where these shares sum up to less than one; in other words, there is a surplus. Thus,
the set of division problems consists of the unit simplex and all its full-dimensional subsim-
plices with the same orientation. Our approach to this division problem is choice-theoretic:
we interpret a chosen division as the best one among all feasible divisions, and therefore
assume that it should again be chosen if it is still available when the minimal entitlements
increase. Expressed more formally, we consider choice rules that are independent of irrel-
evant alternatives in the sense of Nash (1950). The other basic property we impose on
choice rules is continuity with respect to the minimal shares. Combined, these two con-
ditions have an additional powerful consequence: if an individual receives more than the
minimal share in a certain division problem and this minimal share decreases, then the
chosen division does not change (Lemma 1). We use the terms division problem and choice
problem interchangeably in this paper.
For the general n-person choice problem we add a third condition, called monotonicity.
Suppose that, in a given division problem, an individual receives its minimal share at a
chosen division. If this minimal share increases, the additional amount accruing to this
individual is taken away only from other individuals who initially received more than their
minimal shares. This is a plausible fairness condition and facilitates the description of pos-
sible choice rules. Our main result (Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 3) is the characterization
of all choice rules satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives, continuity, and mono-
tonicity. We refer to the resulting choice rules as N -path choice functions, where N is the
set of individuals. An N -path is a collection of monotonic and continuous curves for N and
for all subsets of N , in the simplex that represents the choice problem when all minimal
shares are zero. These curves additionally satisfy a consistency condition. The associated
rule assigns to the subsimplex corresponding to a choice problem the point where one of
these curves enters the subsimplex; consistency ensures that if two different curves enter
the subsimplex, this entry point is independent of the choice of the requisite curve. For
the case n = 3 we obtain a larger class of rules by weakening the monotonicity condition
(Theorem 3).
In the final part of the paper (Section 5) we investigate the issue of rationalizability.
In our setting, independence of irrelevant alternatives is equivalent to the weak axiom of
revealed preference, which requires that in the preference relation induced by a choice rule
there are no cycles of length two. The strong axiom of revealed preference demands that
there are no cycles of any length. We first show that, in the three-agent case, excluding
cycles of length K or less does not necessarily exclude cycles of length K + 1 (Theorem
4)—thus, in particular, independence of irrelevant alternatives does not guarantee ratio-
nalizability, that is, the strong axiom of revealed preference. Second, we show that (again,
for the case of three individuals) adding continuity and non-existence of cycles of length
three implies the strong axiom of revealed preference (Theorem 5). An extension of the
latter result for n > 3 remains an open question.
The choice problem examined in this paper can be seen as the counterpart of the
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familiar bankruptcy problem, where the shares are claims which sum up to more than one
and thus cannot all be satisfied. See Thomson (2015) for an up-to-date overview of the
literature on bankruptcy problems. Stovall (2014) considers the bankruptcy problem from
a choice-theoretic perspective similar to ours.
Our paper contributes to the literature on revealed preference and rationalizability,
starting with the seminal work of Samuelson (1938) and later Arrow (1959), Uzawa (1960),
and Richter (1966, 1971). We refer to Bossert and Suzumura (2010) for a recent overview
of this literature. The present paper is perhaps most closely related to Bossert and Peters
(2009), where choice sets are compact and convex subsets of Rn. Here, the domain of choice
sets—the standard simplex in Rn and all its subsimplices with the same orientation—is on
the one hand much smaller but on the other hand much more specified. One of the common
denominators in the literature (see, for instance, Rose, 1958, Peters and Wakker, 1991;
1994, Bossert, 1994, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson, 1995, and Bossert and Peters,
2009) is that while in two dimensions (which corresponds to the case n = 3 in the present
paper) cycles of any length are excluded if cycles of length two or three are excluded, this
observation does not carry over to more than two dimensions. Thus, as mentioned above,
the case of more than three agents remains an unsolved problem.
2 Basic definitions
We consider n-dimensional choice problems, where n ∈ N \ {1}. The set of coordinates is
N = {1, . . . , n}. Our notation for vector inequalities is x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and
x > y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N . The Euclidean distance is denoted by ‖ · ‖ and ei is the ith
unit vector. We adopt the notational convention
∑
j∈∅ pj = 0.









are used to parametrize the choice problems considered in this paper. For any α ∈ A, the










Observe that each ∆(α) is a full-dimensional subsimplex of the unit simplex in Rn with the
same orientation. It represents the division problem where each individual i is entitled to
a minimal share αi. For α ∈ A and i ∈ N , the vector that is obtained by replacing αi with
α′i is denoted by (α−i, α
′
i).
A choice function is a mapping C : A→ ∆(0, . . . , 0) such that C(α) ≥ α for all α ∈ A.
We interpret C(α) as the choice from the simplex ∆(α). Note that we restrict attention to
single-valued choices.
The following properties of choice functions are used in this paper.
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all α, β ∈ A,
[C(α) ≥ β ≥ α] ⇒ C(β) = C(α).
Continuity. For all sequences 〈αq〉q∈N such that αq ∈ A for all q ∈ N and all α ∈ A,
lim
q→∞
αq = α ⇒ lim
q→∞
C(αq) = C(α).
Monotonicity. For all α ∈ A, all i ∈ N and α′i ∈ (αi, 1) such that (α−i, α′i) ∈ A, and all
j ∈ N such that C(α)j > αj,
C(α)i = αi ⇒ C(α−i, α′i)j ≤ C(α)j.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity are well-established properties in
choice theory. Monotonicity says that if the ith constraint at a point α ∈ A is active at
the choice from ∆(α) and this constraint is increased, then the choice in the new situation
cannot increase at any other constraint where there was slack before. In other words, if
individual i obtains its minimal share and in the new choice (division) problem this minimal
share increases, so that individual i will receive more, then no other individual who received
more than its minimal share originally, will be better off in the new problem. This is a
plausible property for a choice rule, and it will facilitate the description of the class of
N -path choice rules in the next section.
The following lemma says that under independence of irrelevant alternatives and conti-
nuity, if an individual receives more than its minimal share, then the chosen outcome will
not change if this minimal share decreases. The lemma will be extremely useful throughout
the paper.
Lemma 1. Let n ∈ N\{1}, let C be a choice function satisfying independence of irrelevant
alternatives and continuity, and let α ∈ A, i ∈ N and ti ∈ [0, αi). If αi < C(α)i, then
C(α) = C(α−i, ti).
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that C(α) 6= C(α−i, ti). By continuity, there
exists t′i ∈ [ti, αi) such that
C(α−i, t′i) ≥ α and C(α−i, t′i) 6= C(α).
Since C(αi, t
′
i) ≥ α ≥ (α−i, t′i), independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that
C(α−i, t′i) = C(α)
which is a contradiction.




















= y3. Let t3 = 0 and suppose, by way of contradiction, that
C(0, 1
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= z′ 6= y.
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Figure 1: Proof of Lemma 1.
3 N-path choice functions
In this section we define N -path choice functions and show that these are exactly all choice
functions satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives, continuity, and monotonicity.
We first define elementary S-paths (Definition 1), then N -paths (Definition 2), and finally
N -path choice functions (Definition 3).
Definition 1.
(a) Let S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2. An elementary S-path is a (1 + |S|)-tuple (p, (f i)i∈S) where
(i) p ∈ ∆(0, . . . , 0) is such that ∑j∈N\S pj < 1;






→ {x ∈ ∆(0, . . . , 0) | xj = pj for all j ∈ N \ S}












, t′i > ti implies f
i(t′i)j ≤ f i(ti)j for all j ∈ S \ {i}.
Thus, an elementary S-path is obtained by fixing the coordinates of individuals outside
S, picking a point in the subsimplex for S, and starting from this point taking |S| continuous
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increasing curves to the vertices of the subsimplex; monotonicity of such an S-path means
that these curves do not increase in any of the other coordinates.
Observe that if |S| = 2 in Definition 1, then an elementary S-path (p, (f i)i∈S) is uniquely
determined by its starting point p.
Definition 2.
(a) An N -path Π assigns to every S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2 a collection of elementary S-paths,
described recursively as follows:
(0) (p, (f i)i∈N) is an elementary N -path.




is an elementary N \ {i1}-path.
(k) Whenever n ≥ 4, for 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 2, all distinct i1, . . . , ik ∈ N , and all
tik ∈
[









is an elementary N \ {i1, . . . , ik}-path.
(b) The N -path Π is consistent if, whenever n ≥ 4, for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2, all distinct









for every ` = 2, . . . , k, then
f i1,ti1 ;...;ik−1,tik−1 ;ik(tik) = f
pi(i1),tpi(i1);...;pi(ik−1),tpi(ik−1);pi(ik)(tpi(ik))
for all ti1 , . . . , tik in the respective domains.
(c) The N -path Π is continuous if for the functions f i1,ti1 ;...;ik,tik ;j in (1) we have that, for
all sequences 〈(tqi1 , . . . , tqik)〉q∈N and all (t′i1 , . . . , t′ik),
lim
q→∞
(tqi1 , . . . , t
q
ik


















for every tj in the respective domains.
(d) The N -path Π is monotonic if each elementary S-path belonging to it is monotonic.
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Thus, an N -path starts with an elementary N -path, consisting of n continuous curves
from a point p to each of the vertices. Next, for each curve f i and each point f i(ti) on
that curve, we have an elementary N \ {i} path in the subsimplex obtained by fixing the
ith coordinate at ti. This process is repeated until we arrive at (uniquely determined)
elementary S-paths for |S| = 2.
Consistency of an N -path means that if we move a number of steps along the N -path
and reach a certain point, then we reach the same point if we permute the steps in this
movement; condition (2) restricts this requirement to well-defined movements.
Continuity requires that, in addition to the implicit property that all curves in ele-
mentary paths are continuous, all curves behave continuously with respect to changes in
starting points.
Monotonicity means that all elementary paths in the requisite N -paths are monotonic.
We will now define a choice function based on a consistent, continuous, and monotonic
N -path.
Definition 3.
Let Π be an N -path as in Definition 2, and let Π be consistent, continuous, and monotonic.
The choice function CΠ is determined via the following algorithm. Let α ∈ A.
(0) If p0 := p ≥ α then CΠ(α) = p0.
Otherwise, go to Step 1.
(1) Let N1 = {i ∈ N | αi > p0i } and let i1, . . . , i`1 be an ordering of N1.
If p1 := f
i1,αi1 ;...;i`1−1,αi`1−1;i`1 (αi`1 ) ≥ α, then CΠ(α) = p1.
Otherwise, go to Step 2.
(2) Let N2 = {i ∈ N | αi > p1i } and let i`1+1, . . . , i`2 be an ordering of N2.
If p2 := f
i1,αi1 ;...;i`2−1,αi`2−1;i`2 (αi`2 ) ≥ α, then CΠ(α) = p2.
Otherwise, go to Step 3.
(k) Let Nk = {i ∈ N | αi > pk−1i } and let i`k−1+1, . . . , i`k be an ordering of Nk.
If pk := f
i1,αi1 ;...;i`k−1,αi`k−1;i`k (αi`k ) ≥ α, then CΠ(α) = pk.
Otherwise, go to Step k + 1.
In words, in order to determine the outcome in a particular division problem ∆(α), we
start from the solution p of the problem ∆(0) and successively increase, along the curves
in the elementary N -path, the shares in all coordinates (individuals) for which such an
increase is possible. If we reach the subsimplex ∆(α), the algorithm terminates and the
choice is determined. Otherwise, we continue with the next set of coordinates along curves
in the associated elementary paths and continue until we reach ∆(α). The consistency
requirement guarantees that, in the requisite consecutive steps, the order in which we
increase the coordinates does not matter. The proof of the following theorem formalizes
this. For the case n = 3, the following section provides some diagrammatic illustrations of
the process involved in this construction.
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Theorem 1. Let Π be a consistent, continuous, and monotonic N-path. Then CΠ is
well-defined, continuous, monotonic, and independent of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. Clearly, since the algorithm defining CΠ follows a sequence of functions in ele-
mentary paths, it terminates at or before Step n − 1 for every α ∈ A. If the algorithm
terminates at Step 1, then by consistency of Π the ordering of the elements of N1 does not
matter; moreover, monotonicity of each of the curves used in Step 1 ensures that Step 1
is well-defined for any ordering. Similarly, if the algorithm terminates at Step 2, then the
ordering of the elements of N2 does not matter, etc. Hence, CΠ is well-defined.
Continuity of CΠ follows from continuity of Π and continuity of the functions in every
elementary S-path in Π.
To prove monotonicity of CΠ , let α ∈ A, i ∈ N , and α′i ∈ (0, 1) be such that α′i > αi
and (α−i, α′i) ∈ A, and let j ∈ N be such that CΠ(α)j > αj. Also let CΠ(α)i = αi.
We have to show that CΠ(α−i, α′i)j ≤ CΠ(α)j. Let Nα and Nα′ denote the unions of
the sets N1α, N
2




α′ , . . . in the algorithm for C
Π(α) and CΠ(α′), respectively.
If i /∈ Nα′ , then i /∈ Nα which, in turn, implies CΠ(α) = CΠ(α′) so that in particular
CΠ(α−i, α′i)j ≤ CΠ(α)j. If i ∈ Nα′ , then if (say) CΠ(α′) = f
i1,α′i1 ;...;i`k−1,α
′
i`k−1;i`k (α′i`k ), we
may assume that i = i`k . Then either C
Π(α) = f i1,αi1 ;...;i`k−1(αi`k−1) (if the i-th coordinate
of this point is equal to αi) or C
Π(α) = f
i1,αi1 ;...;i`k−1,αi`k−1;i`k (αi`k ) (if the i-th coordinate
of the previous point was strictly smaller than αi). In either case, C
Π(α−i, α′i)j ≤ CΠ(α)j
follows from the monotonicity of the function f
i1,αi1 ;...;i`k−1,αi`k−1;i`k .
In order to show that CΠ is independent of irrelevant alternatives, let α, β ∈ A with
CΠ(α) ≥ β ≥ α. We wish to show that CΠ(α) = CΠ(β). Clearly, if p ≥ α, then
p = CΠ(α) ≥ β, hence CΠ(β) = p = CΠ(α). Now denote the sets N1, N2, . . . and
the points p1, p2, . . . in the algorithm applied to α and β by N1α, N
2




β , . . ., and
p1α, p
2




β, . . ., respectively. Suppose C
Π(α) is determined in Step k ≥ 1. Then, for
each i ∈ N1α ∪ . . . ∪ Nkα, we have αi = CΠ(α)i ≥ βi ≥ αi so that αi = βi. This implies
N1α ⊆ N1β . Suppose that j /∈ N1α ∪ . . . ∪ Nkα but j ∈ N1β . Then βj > pj ≥ αj since, in
particular, j /∈ N1α. Moreover, the monotonicity of Π implies that pj ≥ CΠ(α)j. Hence
pj ≥ βj, a contradiction. Therefore, N1β ⊆ N1α ∪ . . . ∪ Nkα, but then we have N1β = N1α
since αi = βi for all i ∈ N1α ∪ . . . ∪ Nkα. Next, suppose again that j /∈ N1α ∪ . . . ∪ Nkα,
and assume that N rβ = N
r
α for all r = 1, . . . , ` − 1, where ` ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Suppose that
j ∈ N `β. Then βj > (p`−1β )j = (p`−1α )j ≥ αj, and by monotonicity (p`−1α )j ≥ CΠ(α)j. Hence
(p`−1β )j = (p
`−1
α )j ≥ CΠ(α)j ≥ βj, a contradiction. This implies N `β ⊆ N1α ∪ . . . ∪ Nkα, and
thus again N `β = N
`
α. Since C
Π(α) ≥ β, we conclude that CΠ(β) = CΠ(α).
The next result establishes the converse of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let C be a choice function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives,
continuity, and monotonicity. Then there exists a consistent, continuous, and monotonic
N-path Π such that C = CΠ .
Proof. We iteratively construct an N -path Π as follows.
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(0) Let p = C(0, . . . , 0) and for every i ∈ N let f i be defined by f i(ti) = C(tiei) for every
ti ∈ [pi, 1]. Then f i(ti) = ti by Lemma 1. Moreover, the functions f i are continuous
and monotonic by the continuity and monotonicity of C. Hence, (p, (f i)i∈N) is an
elementary N -path which is monotonic.
(1) For all distinct i, j ∈ N and ti ∈ [pi, 1], let f i,ti;j be defined by f i,ti;j(tj) = C(tiei+tjej)
for every tj ∈ [f i(ti)j, 1−ti]. Then f i,ti;j(tj) = tj by Lemma 1. Moreover, the functions
f i,ti;j are continuous and monotonic by the continuity and monotonicity of C. Hence,
the pair (f i(ti), (f
i,ti;j)j∈N\{i}) is an elementary N -path which is monotonic.
(k) For 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2, all distinct i1, . . . , ik ∈ N , and ti1 , . . . , tik−1 with
∑k−1
j=1 tij <
1, let, for every tik ∈ [f i1,ti1 ;...;ik−1(tik−1)ik), 1 −
∑k−1
j=1 tij ], f




ij). Then f i1,ti1 ;...;ik−1,tik−1 ;ik(tik) = tik by Lemma 1. Moreover, the func-
tions f i1,ti1 ;...;ik−1,tik−1 ;ik are continuous and monotonic by the continuity and mono-
tonicity of C. Hence, (f i1,ti1 ;...;ik−1(tik−1), f
i1,ti1 ;...;ik−1,tik−1 ;j)j∈N\{i1,...,ik−1}) is an ele-
mentary N \ {i1, . . . , ik−1}-path which is monotonic.
The consistency of Π follows by construction, and the continuity of Π follows by the
continuity of C. Finally, we have C(α) = CΠ(α) for all α ∈ A by the construction of Π.
4 The case n = 3
In the case n = 3, an N -path is completely described by its elementary N -path in Step
0 of Definition 2, since for distinct i, j ∈ N the elementary {i, j}-paths in Step 1 are
uniquely determined by (ii) in Definition 1. This makes it is also easy to see that N -paths
are continuous and consistent by definition. Thus, for N = {1, 2, 3} an N -path can be
identified with an elementary N -path Π = (p, (f i)i∈N). We weaken monotonicity of an
N -path to the following condition. The N -path Π = (p, (f i)i∈N) is weakly monotonic if for
all i, j ∈ N and all ti ∈ [pi, 1] and tj ∈ [pj, 1] such that ti + tj < 1,[
f i(ti)j ≥ tj and f j(tj)i ≥ ti
] ⇒ f i(ti) = f j(tj). (3)
For a monotonic N -path the premise in (3) is only satisfied for ti = pi and tj = pj, in which
case f i(ti) = f
j(tj) = p, hence a monotonic N -path satisfies (3).
Now suppose that the choice function C is independent of irrelevant alternatives and
continuous. As in the proof of Theorem 2, let p = C(0, 0, 0) and for each i ∈ N and
ti ∈ [pi, 1] let f i(ti) = C(tiei). Then, by independence of irrelevant alternatives and
continuity (and, in particular, Lemma 1), Π = (p, (f i)i∈N) is an (elementary) N -path such
that C(α) = CΠ(α) for every α ∈ A. Moreover, suppose that the premise of (3) holds.
Then f i(ti), f
j(tj) ∈ ∆(tiei + tjej); since ∆(tiei + tjej) ⊆ ∆(tiei) ∩∆(tjej), independence
of irrelevant alternatives of C implies f i(ti) = f
j(tj). Hence (3) holds.
Conversely, for an (elementary) N -path Π = (p, (f i)i∈N) satisfying weak monotonicity
we construct a choice function CΠ analogous to Definition 3—this construction now greatly
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simplifies as follows. Let α ∈ A and define
Nα>p = {i ∈ N | αi > pi}.
Then
(a) if Nα>p = ∅, then CΠ(α) = p;
(b) if Nα>p 6= ∅, then CΠ(α) = argminx≥α{‖ x− f i(α) ‖ for some i ∈ Nα>p}.
By (3), CΠ(α) in (b) is well-defined. It is easy to verify that CΠ is independent of irrelevant
alternatives and continuous. Summarizing, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let n = 3. A choice function C satisfies independence of irrelevant alter-
natives and continuity if and only if there is a weakly monotonic (elementary) N-path
Π = (p, (f i)i∈N) such that C = CΠ .
For n = 3, an example of an N -path Π = (p, f) = (p, (f i)i∈N) and the associated choice
function CΠ is presented in the following example. Figures 2 to 5 provide illustrations for
different choices of (f i)i∈N and different values of the parameter α = (α1, α2, α3).






) and in each of
Figures 2 to 4, the set ∆(α) is indicated by the shaded area.
(a) In Figure 2, we let α = (0, 0, 0). The three paths leading from p to each of the
three vertices of ∆(0, 0, 0) are associated with the functions f 1, f 2, and f 3. We obtain
CΠ(α) = p by definition.
(b) In Figure 3, we illustrate the choice for α = (0, 0, 1
4
). Because Nα>p = ∅, part (a) of















































, 0). According to our definition, we






) = y. Note that we have Nα>p = {1, 2}, C2(α) = y2 = 38 = α2, and





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Example 1, part (d).
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5 Rationalizability in the case n = 3
The notion of rationalizability is a fundamental issue in the theory of individual and collec-
tive choice. In our context, a choice function C is rationalizable if there exists an ordering
R on ∆(0, . . . , 0) such that, for all α ∈ A and for all x ∈ ∆(α),
C(α) = x ⇔ xRy for all y ∈ ∆(α).
The direct revealed preference relation RC corresponding to the choice function C is defined
by letting, for all x, y ∈ ∆(0, . . . , 0), xRCy if there exists α ∈ A such that C(α) = x and
y ≥ α. A revealed-preference cycle in C of lengthK ∈ N\{1} is a set of distinct alternatives
{x1, . . . , xK} such that xkRCxk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, where xK+1 = x1. The following
axioms are well-established in the theory of rational choice.
Weak axiom of revealed preference. There is no revealed-preference cycle of length
two in C.
Strong axiom of revealed preference. For all K ∈ N \ {1}, there is no revealed-
preference cycle of length K in C.
It is well-known that, because our choice function is single-valued, rationalizability is
equivalent to the strong axiom of revealed preference. The strong axiom of revealed prefer-
ence implies the weak axiom which, in turn, implies independence of irrelevant alternatives.
This is true for a choice function with an arbitrary domain. Because the domain of our
choice function is closed under intersection, the weak axiom of revealed preference is equiv-
alent to the independence property.
We now illustrate that, on our domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives (or,
equivalently, the weak axiom of revealed preference) is not sufficient for rationalizability in
the case n = 3. Moreover, for any K ∈ N, ruling out the existence of revealed-preference
cycles of any length less than K + 1 is not sufficient to rule out cycles of length K + 1.
This is established in the following theorem. For that case, we denote the left, right and
top vertices of a simplex ∆(α) by `(α), r(α), and t(α), hence `(α) = (1− α2 − α3, α2, α3),
r(α) = (α1, 1− α1 − α3, α3), and t(α) = (α1, α2, 1− α1 − α2).
Theorem 4. Let n = 3. For each K ∈ N, there exists a choice function CK+1 on the
simplex domain such that there is a revealed-preference cycle of length K + 1 in CK+1 and
no revealed-preference cycle of length less than K + 1 in CK+1.




`(α) if α = (0, 0, 0),
r(α) if α 6= (0, 0, 0).
Then
































so that the points (1, 0, 0) and (1
2
, 0, 0) form a cycle of length two (and, trivially, there is
no cycle of length less than two).
For the case K = 2, consider the choice function C3 defined by letting, for all α ∈ A,
C3(α) =

`(α) if α3 ≥ 12 ,
r(α) if α1 ≥ 12 ,
t(α) if α2 ≥ 12 ,











































































































but there is no cycle of length two.
For the case K = 3, consider the choice function C4 defined by letting, for all α ∈ A,
C4(α) =
{
C4∗(α) if α3 ≥ 12 ,




where C4∗ : {α ∈ A | α3 ≥ 12} → ∆(0, 0, 0) is defined by
C4∗(α) =
{
`(α) if α1 ≥ 14 or α2 ≥ 14 ,






























































































































































) but no cycles of smaller length.
This last choice function can be generalized to all K ≥ 3 as follows. Consider the choice
function CK+1 defined by letting, for all α ∈ A,
CK+1(α) =
{





where CK+1∗ : {α ∈ A | α3 ≥ 12 and α2 ≥ 2
K−3−1
2K−2 } → ∆(0, 0, 0) is defined by
CK+1∗ (α) =
{
`(α) if α1 ≥ 12K−1 or α2 ≥ 2
K−2−1
2K−1 ,













































































































































































































), but no cycles of smaller length.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Theorem 4, the case K=4.
Even if continuity and monotonicity are added to independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives, a choice function on the simplex domain need not be rationalizable. Let n = 3 and









(t1, t1, 1− 2t1) if t1 ∈ [13 , 12 ],
(t1, 1− t1, 0) if t1 ∈ (12 , 1],
f 2(t2) =
{
(1− 2t2, t2, t2) if t2 ∈ [13 , 12 ],
(0, t2, 1− t2) if t2 ∈ (12 , 1],
f 3(t3) =
{
(t3, 1− 2t3, t3) if t1 ∈ [13 , 12 ],
(1− t3, 0, t3) if t3 ∈ (12 , 1].
Because CΠ is anN -path choice function, it satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives,
continuity, and monotonicity. But this choice function is not rationalizable because there

















, 0) = CΠ(1
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Figure 10: A non-rationalizable n-path choice function CΠ .
It is straightforward to verify that, for n = 3, some N -path choice functions are ratio-












) for all t1 ∈ [13 , 1],





) for all t1 ∈ [13 , 1],





) for all t1 ∈ [13 , 1].
This choice function is rationalized by the Euclidean distance from p multiplied by −1,
that is, we have, for all α ∈ A and for all x ∈ ∆(α),




































































































































Figure 11: A rationalizable n-path choice function CΠ .
It turns out that in the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity
of the choice function, it is necessary and sufficient to exclude cycles of length three in
order to obtain rationalizability. In view of Theorem 3, this statement is equivalent to the
following result.
Theorem 5. Let n = 3 and let C = CΠ , where Π is a weakly monotonic N-path. Then C
satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference if and only if there is no revealed-preference
cycle of length three in C.
Proof. If C satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference, then clearly there is no
revealed-preference cycle of length three.
Now suppose that there is no revealed-preference cycle of length three in C. Because the
simplex domain is closed under intersection and choice functions corresponding to weakly
monotonic N -paths satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, they also satisfy the
weak axiom of revealed preference and, thus, there is no revealed-preference cycle of length
two in C. Let K > 3 and let x1, . . . , xK be distinct alternatives such that xkRCxk+1 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, where xK+1 = x1. The proof is complete once we establish that there is a
revealed-preference cycle of length less than K in C.
(a) Let α ∈ A such that ∆(α) is the (unique) smallest choice set containing the points
x1, . . . , xK , and write D = ∆(α). Then {x1, . . . , xK}∩{`(α), r(α), t(α)} = ∅ since otherwise
by Lemma 1 there would be a cycle of length two. Also, note that each edge of D contains
an element of {x1, . . . , xK} in its interior. Suppose, without loss of generality, that x1 is
in the relative interior of the left edge of D and that x23 ≥ x13. Then by Lemma 1 we
have x1 = C({x ∈ D | x3 ≥ x13}) and x2 ∈ {x ∈ D | x3 ≥ x13}. See Figure 12. If
18
{x ∈ D | x3 ≥ x13} ∩ {x3, . . . , xK} 6= ∅ then we can construct a shorter cycle and are done.
So we now assume {x ∈ D | x3 ≥ x13} ∩ {x3, . . . , xK} = ∅, that is, x33, . . . , xK3 < x13.
Next let
E = {x ∈ D | x2 ≥ x22}.
If xk ∈ E for some k ∈ {4, . . . , K}, then we have x2RCxk and therefore a cycle of length
less than K in C. Now we assume that x4, . . . , xK 6∈ E. Consider the parallelograms
F = {x ∈ D | x2 ≤ x22 and x3 ≤ x13}
and
G = {x ∈ D | x1 ≤ x21 and x3 ≤ x13}
(the shaded regions in Figure 12). Suppose x2 is not on the right edge of D, that is, G 6= ∅.
Since D is minimal there is a k 6= 1, 2 with xk ∈ G. If xk+1 ∈ F , then we also have
xkRCx2 because xkRCxk+1 and thus there is a shorter cycle. Now assume xk+1 ∈ G and,
by repeating this argument, xK ∈ G. Since xKRCx1, we obtain again xKRCx2, and thus a
shorter cycle.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Theorem 5, part (a).
(b) Let
H = {x ∈ D | x1 ≥ x11}
(see Figure 13). Since x2RCx3 we have x3 ∈ E, since otherwise by Lemma 1 we would
have x2RCx1, a contradiction. Consider a choice set (triangle) D′ so that x3RCx4. If x3 is
19
on the left edge including the left and top vertices of D′, we have x4 ∈ E and therefore,
by Lemma 1, x2RCx4 and thus a shorter cycle. So we now assume that x3 is on the
right or bottom edge of D′ including the right vertex. If x3 is on the bottom edge of D′
excluding the vertices, Lemma 1 implies x3RCx1 and thus we have a cycle of length three,
a contradiction. Hence, x3 is on the right edge or the right vertex of D′. This implies,
moreover, that x31 > x
1
1; otherwise, again by Lemma 1, we have x
3RCx1 and thus a cycle
of length three, a contradiction. In particular, x3 ∈ E ∩H and x3 is not on the right edge


















































































































Figure 13: Theorem 5, part (b).
(c) To conclude the proof, we repeat the arguments in (a) and (b) but now for x2, . . . , x5
instead of x1, . . . , x4, respectively, where x5 = x1 in case K = 4. Define, analogously to E
and H, the sets E ′ and H ′ by
E ′ = {x ∈ D | x1 ≥ x31} and H ′ = {x ∈ D | x3 ≥ x23}.
Note that the arguments in (a) and (b) for x1, . . . , x4 either resulted in shorter cycles or,
in the end, in x3 ∈ E ∩H. Since E ′ ∩H ′ = ∅, analogous arguments for x2, . . . , x5 result in
shorter cycles.
6 Concluding remarks
The main open problem in connection to this paper is the rationalizability question if
n > 3. On the one hand, the existing literature (see Section 1) would suggest that even
under additional conditions exclusion of cycles of a particular length does not imply the
20
strong axiom of revealed preference. On the other hand, the domain of choice problems in
the present paper is rather restricted, so that this general insight may not carry over.
Finally, we note that the axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and conti-
nuity are incompatible with the assumption that requires C to assume all possible values
in its range ∆(0, . . . , 0). If p1 = 1, the point e
i for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n} will never be chosen,
as can be seen by applying Lemma 1; similarly, if p1 6= 1, e1 is never chosen.
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